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Existence, Proof and Truth-Making: 
A Perspective on the Intuitionistic 
Conception of Truth* GOran Sundholm 
ABSTRACT. Truth-maker analyses construe truth as existence of 
proof, a well-known example being that offered by Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus. The paper subsumes the intuitionistic view of truth as 
existence of proof under the general truth-maker scheme. Two generic 
constraints on truth-maker analysis are noted and positioned with 
respect to the writings of Michael Dummett and the Tractatus. 
Examination of the writings of Brouwer, Heyting and Weyl indicates 
the specific notions of truth-maker and existence that are at issue in 
the intuitionistic truth-maker analysis, namely that of proof in the 
sense of proof-object (Brouwer, Heyting) and existence in the non- 
propositional sense of a judgement abstract (Weyl). Furthermore, 
possible anticipations in the writings of Schlick and Pf~tnder are 
noted. 
. 
Michael  Dummet t  writes: 
From an intuitionistic standpoint . . . an understanding of a 
mathematical statement consists in the capacity to recognize a 
proof when presented with one; and the truth of such a statement 
can consist only in the existence of such a proof. 1 
It is the purpose  o f  the present  paper  to offer  some  
remarks o f  a phi losophical  and historical nature on this 
concept ion  o f  truth and its meaning- theore t ica l  use. 
o 
The intuitionistic scheme 
A is true 
there exists a p roof  o f  A 
can prof i tably be const rued as a special instance o f  the 
general  t ru th-maker  analysis o f  truth: 
A is true 
there exists a t ru th-maker  for  A, 
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which can best be seen as an at tempt at g iving content  
to the metaphors  involved  in the so cal led correspon-  
dence theory o f  truth, z 
In general,  a t ru th-maker  analysis is given in terms 
o f  three items, namely, 
(1) the (category of)  truth-bearers A, 
(2) for  each object  a o f  the ca tegory  o f  truth-bearers,  
a ca tegory  T M  a of  t ruth-makers  for  A, 
and finally, 
(3) the re levant  not ion o f  exis tence for  the ca tegory  
T M  A . 
Leibniz ' s  Sa t z  v o m  G r u n d e  provides a case in point:  
A true proposition is one where the predicate is contained in its 
subject, or, more generally, whose consequent is contained in its 
antecedent, and it is therefore necessary that there should be some 
connexion between notions of the terms, i.e. that there should be 
an objective foundation from which the reason for the proposi- 
tion can be given, or, an a priori proof can be found. 3 
Here  the t ru th-bearer  is a p ropos i t ion  in the old-  
f a s h i o n e d  sense, that is, a judgement  o f  subject /copula/  
predicate  fo rm 
S i s P  
Leibniz  construes all truth, whether  necessary or  con- 
t ingent,  as analytic.  The  propos i t ion  is true when the 
predicate is conta ined in the subject, such conta inment  
being made  evident  f rom a certain ground,  or  reason, 
namely  a possibly infinite a p r i o r i  proof  o f  the judge-  
ment  in quest ion,  cons is t ing  o f  (poss ib ly  infinite) 
resolutions o f  the concepts  S and P into primit ive com-  
ponents.  A truth o f  reason has a finite proof,  whereas 
the resolution proceeds to infinity in the case o f  a truth 
o f  cont ingent  fact. The truth-maker is this a pr io r i  proof  
and the relevant not ion o f  existence is resolvabil i ty (in 
the mind  of  God).  Modern  t ru th-maker  analyses were 
offered in the ear ly  parts o f  the present  century  by 
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Husserl, Moore, and Russell, using as truth-makers, for 
example, facts, complexes and Sachverhalte. The most 
elaborated of these modern attempts, surely, is that 
presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. 4 
. 
The particular properties of a given truth-maker analysis 
will obviously depend on the three specific choices 
made as to the truth-bearers, their truth-makers, and the 
appropriate mode of existence for the chosen truth- 
makers. Clearly, in view of the rich variety of truth- 
maker analyses that has been offered, one cannot expect 
to establish too many general theses, applicable to any 
truth-maker analysis, from the very formulation of the 
generic truth-maker scheme itself. 
In the Dummett passage quoted above, the link 
between truth- and meaning-theoretical issues is faced 
squarely from the outset, and the meaning of a sentence 
is, of course, commonly formulated in terms of truth 
conditions. These, on the other hand, are given in terms 
of a notion of truth that is construed according to the 
truth-maker analysis in question. Therefore, on the 
hypothesis that meaning is given in terms of truth 
conditions, the truth-maker analysis will be subjected to 
meaning-theoretical constraints. Such constraints, then, 
provide further conceptual structure which might enable 
us to formulate some general insights concerning the 
truth-maker analysis of truth. 
. 
One remark concerning truth-maker analyses that can 
be made bears on the application of the notion of 
identity to truth-bearers. An appropriate notion of 
identity for truth-bearers can be obtained without effort 
given the truth-maker analysis. An identity criterion is 
readily formulated in terms of the truth-makers: 
A is the same truth-bearer as B 
iff 
the truth-maker categories T M  A and TM B coincide 
An alternative, essentially equivalent choice would 
be to use instead: 
A is the same truth-bearer as B 
iff 
every truth-maker for A is a truth-maker for B, 
and vice versa. 
When the truth-bearers are propositions, the above 
constitutes a simple solution to the old Quinean chal- 
lenge of providing a criterion of identity for proposi- 
tions. 
A second general point can be made concerning 
the notion of existence that is involved in a meaning- 
theoretically constrained truth-maker analysis. Here the 
meaning of a sentence A is laid down in terms of its 
truth condition 
A is true. 
Thus, on pain of a vicious regress of ever-descending 
meaning-explanations, the predicate 
• . .  is true 
cannot be propositional in nature. In other words, it is 
not a propositional function formulated in the language 
from which the sentences are taken whose meaning is 
explained using the predicate in question. When com- 
bined with the truth-maker analysis this yields the result 
that the existence involved in such an analysis is not 
that of the existential quantification 
3xe(x) .  
It must be observed first that there is no such thing as 
the meaning of this quantifier independently of its 
occurrence in existential propositions; on the contrary, 
the meaning of the quantifier is explained as part of the 
existential proposition having such and such a truth- 
condition. Furthermore, the proper form of the quan- 
tification is 
(3x ~ D)P(x),  
since the usual, model-theoretic explanation of the 
semantics of the quantifier suppresses the domain of 
quantification, owing to the separation of syntax and 
semantics. Here when the quantified formulae express 
propositions, rather than serve as the formal objects of 
metamathematical study, the domain of quantification 
has to be explicitly included. The meaning of the exis- 
tential quantifier 3 is accordingly explained in terms of 
the conditions under which (3x ~ D)P(x) is true. 
On the truth-maker analysis this truth condition is 
analysed as: 
there exists a truth-maker for (3x ~ D)P(x). 
If the existence involved here were itself to be expressed 
by means of an existential quantifier, firstly, in order 
that the quantifier be applicable, the relation of truth- 
EXISTENCE, PROOF AND TRUTH-MAKING 119 
making between the t ruth-maker  and the true pro- 
position would have to be a proposit ional  function. 
Secondly, an infinite regress would arise: 
(3z e the category of  t ruth-makers  for (3x 
D)P(x)) 
[the relation of  t ruth-making obtains between z 
and the proposition (3x e D)P(x)], 
since the first existential quantifier 3z has yet again to 
be expressed in terms of  the truth-condition for an 
existentially quantified proposition, and so on. Thus, the 
notion of existence at issue here is not that of  the 
existential quantifier. Accordingly, also the status of  the 
relation of  t ruth-making between the truth-bearer and 
the truth-maker is sub judice and one cannot expect it 
to be that of  a propositional function: if it were, it would 
immediately combine with the existential quantifier to 
yield a proposition of the rejected, regress-infested type. 
. 
Phenomena  related to, or originating in, this unusual 
status of  the relation of  truth-making have been noted 
by Dummet t  in his comments  on an argument for the 
undefinabil i ty of  truth, that is, against the possibil i ty 
of a general characterization of the concept of  truth. The 
argument runs roughly as follows: 
(i) In order to find the condition for a proposition p 
to be true, a general  characterization of  truth is 
applied to p. 
(ii) In order to apply the general characterization to 
p, one needs to know what proposition p is. 
(iii) In order to know what proposit ion p is, one must 
know the condition for p to be true. 
(iv) Thus, in order to apply the general truth-charac- 
terization to the proposit ion p, one must already 
know the outcome of  this application. 
Applying this to sentences, Dummet t  concludes that " if  
you know what a sentence means, you do not need any 
criterion for its truth, and, if  you do not know what it 
means you cannot possibly apply any such criterion". 5 
Dummet t  then notes that "what the argument shows 
is that the concept of  truth is intricately bound up with 
the concept of  meaning; no philosophical elucidation of  
either concept is to be had which does not at the same 
time provide an elucidation of  the other one". The point 
gets rephrased as: 
If to grasp the meaning of a sentence involves knowing when it 
• . .  is true, then this knowledge must involve knowing what it is, 
in general, for a sentence.., to be true. To know this is neither 
necessary or sufficient to know, of every particular sentence, 
under what conditions it is true. It must, rather, involve knowing 
how in all cases the concept of truth is related to that of meaning. 
To be more exact, we ought here to speak of an implicit grasp of 
the connection between the concepts of meaning and of truth, 
rather than of a knowledge of it. 6 
This connect ion between meaning and truth can take 
either of  two forms. It is direct when meaning is given 
in terms of truth. The connection will be mediated when 
meaning is ultimately given in terms of  another notion. 
In this second case, as Dummet t  rightly notes, there has 
to be a uniform manner of  deriving the notion of  truth 
from the latter notion in terms of which meaning is then 
ultimately explained: 
we need to distinguish between a feature of an expression which 
is dependent upon its meaning and one that is actually part of that 
meaning. This distinction underlies our intuitive inclination to 
take the meaning as something we confer on an expression . . . . .  
If some feature of an expression is merely dependent on its 
meaning, then it did not have to be conferred and cannot be 
altered; that is, it cannot be altered without altering something 
else to which it is responsible, and from which it derived. If, 
however, it is actually part of the meaning, then, in the sense in 
which it is we who make our words mean what they mean, we 
could alter it without there being anything else which we should, 
as it were, have to alter first] 
In Dummet t ' s  terminology, the condition for a sentence 
to be true will be dependent  on the meaning of the 
sentence in question, but it will not be part of that 
meaning. Meanings are then, ultimately, given in terms 
of  truth-makers and it is the relevant truth-maker that 
is part of  the meaning of  the sentence. The truth-maker 
scheme provides a "general  characterisat ion of  that 
feature (i.e. truth G.S.) in terms of  whichever  other 
feature has been chosen as that by means of  which the 
meaning is given (i.e. the relevant notion of  truth-maker 
G.S.) . . . .  This characterisation will constitute a uniform 
manner of  deriving the former from the latter. ''8 
. 
Consider a truth-maker analysis of  sentential truth. The 
above points made by Dummett  can then be recast using 
terminology derived from Wittgenstein 's  Tractatus. In 
that work, the primary category of truth-bearer is that 
of  an e lementary  proposi t ion (Elementarsatz). (Other 
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truth-bearers, namely the objects of the category of 
propositions, are obtained recursively from the ele- 
mentary propositions by means of (generalized) truth- 
functional combinations. For the purpose of the present 
discussion of the Tractatus, I will use the term 
"proposition" for the elementary propositions.) The 
propositional sign, which is itself a fact in the world, is 
made into a symbol, with meaning, by being placed in 
an internal projective relation to the world, which asso- 
ciates simple names with objects. The symbol comprises 
the material sign, as well as the projective relation to 
the world, but not what is projected. What is projected, 
or presented, is a state of affairs (Sachverhalt). Thus, 
given a meaningful (elementary) sentence, that is, given 
a proposition, it is possible, by virtue of its meaning, 
to read off, am Symbol allein, what has to be the case 
if the proposition is true, namely that the presented state 
of affairs obtains (German: bestehen). This is just what 
a meaningful sentence is: a means for presenting what 
has to be the case if it is to be true. What has to be the 
case, if it is to be true, it is possible to determine from 
the symbol itself, by virtue of its being a symbol: 
internal properties and relations can be read off from 
the symbols themselves, and the relation between propo- 
sition and state of affairs is an internal one. Whether, 
on the other hand, the proposition is indeed true, 
whether what has to be the case if the proposition is to 
be true is in fact the case, is not internal to the symbol, 
but is something which can be found out, if at all, only 
by comparing the proposition with the world. On this 
Tractarian truth-maker analysis of truth and meaning, 
the category of truth-makers corresponding to a propo- 
sition is the singleton category consisting solely of the 
state of affairs presented by the proposition in question, 
and when this state of affairs obtains the proposition is 
true (4.25). 
Finally, let us note that the truth-maker analysis 
offered in the Tractatus does agree with the above two 
general points concerning truth-maker analyses. In 
accordance with the first point concerning the truth- 
maker definability of truth-bearer identity, the presented 
state of affairs does determine the (sense of the) ele- 
mentary proposition (4.2-4.21). In this connection, also 
the following theses, concerning the sense of the 
(complex) proposition, rather than just that of the 
elementary proposition, are highly congenial: 
I will give the name truth-grounds of a proposition to those 
truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that make it true. 
(5.101c) 
If he truth-grounds that are common to a number of propositions 
are at the same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition, then 
we say that the truth of that proposition follows from the truth of 
the others. 
(5.11) 
If p follows from q, the sense of 'p' is contained in the sense of 
(5.121) 
Finally, in accordance with the second, meaning- 
theoretically constrained general point, we should note 
that the notion of existence appropriate to states of 
affairs, namely that of obtaining, is not that of the 
existential quantifier: the latter is explained as a gener- 
alized truth-function of elementary propositions (5.52) 
and, as such, it already presupposes the notion of exis- 
tence involved in the obtaining of the states of affairs. 
Turning now to the general truth-maker scheme, 
Wittgenstein's terminology can profitably be transposed 
also to this context. What a truth-maker for a certain 
truth-bearer has to be, can be read off from the truth- 
bearer sign itself; the relation between the proposition 
and its category of truth-makers is internal. Similarly, 
when the truth-bearer is made true by a given truth- 
maker, the connection between truth-maker and truth- 
bearer is internal. Whether there exists a truth-maker 
or not, is not internally given in the proposition, but can 
only be determined through external research, that is, 
through a comparison with the world. In the Tractatus, 
when the truth-maker exists, that is, when the presented 
state of affairs obtains, the relation between this fact 
(that is, obtaining state of affairs) and the proposition 
is again an internal one. Thus, also in the Tractatus, two 
internal relations are at issue here: first, the relation 
between the proposition and its category of truth-makers 
and, secondly, the relation between the true proposition 
and its truth-maker. 9 The application of the relevant 
notion of existence for the truth-makers is not internal 
to the proposition, however; in general, as we now 
know, truth can be read off from the symbol alone only 
in the exceptional case of tautological truth-functional 
combinations of propositions at the level of the propo- 
sitional calculus. 1° 
. 
The intuitionistic conceptions of meaning and truth that 
I consider here were made explicit around 1930 by 
Brouwer's first pupil, Arend Heyting, then a secondary 
E X I S T E N C E ,  P R O O F  AND T R U T H - M A K I N G  121 
school-teacher at Enschede in the eastern parts of the 
Netherlands. 11 In this section I wish to summarize his 
views in order to show that his intuitionistic concep- 
tion closely follows the general pattern set out above. 12 
We have three notions to consider: the truth-bearers, the 
truth-makers corresponding to a given truth-bearer and 
the notion of existence appropriate to the truth-makers. 
The notion of truth-bearer chosen by Heyting is that 
of a proposition (French (1) proposition, German (2) (3) 
Aussage). A proposition is, or expresses, an expectation 
(French (1) attente, German (2) Erwartung), or a 
problem (French (1)problkme, German (2) Problem (3) 
Aufgabe). 13 As a result of familiarity with Oskar 
Becket's book Mathematische Existenz, Heyting notes 
that the word intention (German (2) Intention), from the 
phenomenological tradition, might best express what is 
at issue he re .  TM 
These various choices as to how to conceive of 
propositions are essentially equivalent, though, in that 
the resulting truth-bearer/truth-maker structures all turn 
out isomorphic. The truth-makers in question are as 
follows: 
an expectation corresponds to a realization 
(French (1) rdalisation, German (2) Erf~llung) 
an intention corresponds to a fulfilment 
(German (2) Erfiillung), 
a problem corresponds to a solution 
(German (3) LOsung). 
These links either were, or could have been forged 
in the phenomenological tradition, where the first 
chapter of Husserl's Vlth Logical Investigation bears 
the title Bedeutungsintention und Bedeutungserfiillung, 
or by the Wittgenstein of note 9. It is precisely at this 
point that intuitionism as primarily a philosophy of 
mathematics intervenes and contributes something 
essentially new: 
a proposition corresponds to a proof. 
In the primary sense, a proof, or perhaps better, a 
demonstration, is the (mental) act whereby the indi- 
vidual mathematician gets to know the truth of a certain 
proposition. The object of such an act of demonstra- 
tion is the theorem proved that the proposition in 
question is true. These acts, proofs in the subjective 
sense, when completed, have no further existence, but 
they may leave tracks or traces. These traces, or proofs 
in the objective sense, are what we find written down 
in mathematical texts and what may be used by other 
mathematicians to carry out proofs in the subjective 
sense for the same theorem. 15 These are not the proofs 
that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker 
conception. Brouwer, in his famous demonstration of 
the Bar Theorem, introduced a novel notion of proof, 
namely proofs as mathematical objects. The German 
term used is that of a Beweisfiihrung. From Brouwer's 
practice it is clear that his Beweisfiihrungen are objects; 
they are named, restricted and transformed in much the 
same way as functions or well-founded trees are, as the 
following extracts show: 
"the proof h shows for an arbitrary element of ~ that is secur- 
able," 
"Let h s n ~  . . . n r  be the specialization of h that derives the 
securability of the element F s n l  . . . h r . "  
"an arbitrary proof, when the connections used in it are 
decomposable into basic connections, can always (at least at 
the expense of brevity) be 'canonized' in such a way that its 
canonical form uses basic connections only" 
"On the basis Of a transfinite induction along f s n l  • . . n r  we see 
further that at every stage of the proof k S n l  . . .  n r .  • . , , 1 6  
The proofs intended by Heyting in the meaning 
explanations are also of this nature: 
A proof of a proposition is a mathematical construction which can 
itself be treated mathematically. 17 
Furthermore: 
every proposition, according to HEYTING, stands for the inten- 
tion towards a mathematical construction that should meet certain 
conditions. A proof of a proposition consists in the actualization 
of the construction it demands. 18 
That the constructions intended in/demanded by propo- 
sitions have to be mathematical objects is brought out 
quite clearly by the very first example offered by 
Heyting: 
A proposition p, for example, "Euler's constant is rational" 
expresses a problem, or better still, a certain expectation (that of 
finding two integers a and b such that C = a / b )  that can be realised 
or disappointed) 9 
What is demanded (intended, expected) by the propo- 
sition (problem, expectation, intention) is a certain 
mathematical object (a mathematical construction which 
can itself be treated mathematically), that satisfies 
certain conditions, depending on the proposition in 
question. The truth of the proposition is demonstrated 
by constructing a proof-object that meets the relevant 
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condi t ions  as de termined by the proposi t ion.  Thus,  in 
summary,  we have to dist inguish between 
(i) proof-acts  (demonstrat ions) ,  
(ii) proof- t races ,  and 
(iii) proof-objects .  
It is the third not ion that serves as t ru th-maker  for the 
mathemat ica l  proposi t ion on the intuitionistic concep-  
tion o f  meaning  and truth, and it is essential to recall 
this when  d i sambigua t ing  the formula t ions  used in 
con temporary  writ ings within the phi losophy o f  math- 
ematics.  As already noted above,  the object  o f  an act 
o f  demons t ra t ion  is the theorem proved.  W h e n  it is 
made  fully explicit, the theorem has the form 
a is a p roof  (-object)  o f  A, 
where  the cons t ruc t ion  a is the objec t  o f  an act o f  
const ruct ion.  A n  alternative,  but,  in the l ight  o f  the 
preceding discussion,  essential ly equivalent,  rendering 
is: 
a is a t ru th-maker  for A. 
With these formulat ions  it is possible to make  at least 
some sense o f  a couple  o f  remarks  o f  Wit tgenstein 's :  
What is proved by a mathematical proof is set up as an internal 
relation and withdrawn from doubt• 
Proof must show an internal relation, not an external one] ° 
On the above analysis,  the internal relation shown by a 
p roof  (-act, demonstra t ion)  is that be tween t ruth-maker  
and truth-bearer ,  that  is, be tween  p roof -ob jec t  and 
mathemat ical  proposi t ion.  
o 
The chosen  t ru th-bearer / t ru th-maker  re lat ion o f  intu- 
i t ionism is not  or ig inal  with in tu i t ionism as we saw. 
Hey t ing  t r ans fo rmed  a we l l -known  connec t ion  f rom 
within the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  tradit ion,  namely  that  
be tween Intention and Erfiillung, by choos ing  the latter 
to be certain mathemat ica l  objects,  which  we now call 
proof-objects .  The not ion o f  existence appropriate to the 
chosen t ruth-maker  relation is genuinely  intuitionistic, 
though. Michael  Dum m et t  writes:  
Hilbert's way of constructing arithmetical propositions involving 
quantification over all natural numbers concedes to them a great 
deal of informative content: it merely denies that they are state- 
ments assessable as true or false . . . .  For any particular natural 
number, say 103, the proposition "A(103)" is then uncontrover- 
sially an informative statement. The existential proposition "For 
some n, A(n)" is taken by Hilbert to be an incomplete com- 
munication of any particular such instance: one is entitled to 
enunciate it if one knows of any specific number of which one 
can show that it satisfies the predicate "A( )". 
The intuitionists in effect accepted Hilbert's characterization of 
the meanings of the existential and universal quantifiers, but 
denied that statements formed by means of them were incapable 
of being subjected to negation or the other sentential operators. 
For them it was necessary only to explain the sentential opera- 
tors in the same manner, rather than by truth-tables: that is, to 
give the meanings of the sentential operators by specifying, for 
each operator, what would justify the assertion of a statement of 
which it was the principal operator. 2~ 
I r respect ive  o f  its possible  sys temat ic  merits,  consid-  
ered as a piece o f  history, this does not get matters quite 
right. The  intuit ionists  did not  have to bo r row this 
notion o f  existence f rom the formalists;  on the contrary, 
they took  it ready made  f rom within their own  tradi- 
tion. 22 
The  term " incomple te  c o m m u n i c a t i o n "  used by 
Dummet t  to describe the formalis t  attitude to the exis- 
tential proposi t ion derives in this context  f rom Kleene. 23 
It was used by him in conjunct ion with the term "partial 
judgement" ,  s imply as a translation o f  the German used 
by Bernays  in Hi lber t -Bernays:  
An existential proposition regarding numerals, that is, a proposi- 
tion of the form "there is a numeral n with the property A(n)", is 
finitistically to be taken as a "partial judgement", that is, as an 
incomplete communication of a further determined proposition, 
24  
The incomplete communication seems to be Bernays ' s  
own contribution.  Partial judgement, though,  goes back 
to Hilbert:  
In general, an existential proposition has, from a finitist point of 
view, only meaning as a partial proposition, that is, as part of 
a further determined proposition, whose precise content is in- 
essential for many applicationsY 
In an earlier article, Hilbert  had already referred to the 
p rob lem o f  nega t ing  the existential  p ropos i t ion  and 
summar ized  the posi t ion as fol lows:  
For finite totalities "there exists" and "there is available, at hand" 
mean the same; for infinite totalities only the latter concept is 
clear at o n c e .  26 
This, however ,  is not  the genesis o f  the formalis t ' s  view 
that exis tence leads to t runcated non-propos i t iona l  
claims. Hilbert  took this not ion f rom his apostate pupil 
Hermann  Weyl.  
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Weyl had strong philosophical interests, especially 
geared towards phenomenology, and in 1918 he re- 
sponded to the crisis in the foundations of mathematics 
with his predicativist manifesto Das Kontinuum. 27 In the 
summer of 1919, Weyl had personal contact with 
Brouwer in Switzerland, where he got a private crash 9. 
course of tutorials in intuitionism from the master 
himself. 28 The result was dramatic: Weyl decided to 
jettison his own project and to join forces with Brouwer. 
This he did publicly in a series of provocative lectures, 
Uber die neue Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik, deliv- 
ered at Ziirich in 1920. Here, in his exposition of basic 
intuitionistic principles, Weyl introduced some novelties: 
An existential Proposition - for instance, "there is an even 
number" - is not at all a proper judgement that expresses a state 
o f  affairs; Existential states of  affairs are an empty invention of  
logicians. "2 is an even number": that is a real judgement  that 
expresses a state of  affairs; "there is an even number" is only a 
judgement-abstract  that has been obtained from this judgement.  29 
This - Weyl's judgement abstract - then, is the for- 
malist's source for his incomplete communication. Thus, 
as stated above, it is not in agreement with the facts to 
say that the intuitionists obtained their notion from the 
formalists. On the contrary, they already had i t)  ° 
Recently Per Martin-L6f has given a streamlined 
version of this notion of existence. 31 When ct is a 
category, a general concept, then 
tx exists 
is a judgement. Which judgement it is, is explained by 
telling what knowledge is expressed by, or in, the judge- 
ment in question. In other words, the judgement is 
explained by telling what knowledge one has to have 
in order to have the right to make it. Here, in order to 
have the right to make the judgement 
o~ exists, 
it is required that one has made some judgement Notes 
a :  13(, 32 
that is, in order to ascribe existence to a general concept 
one has to know an object falling under the concept in 
question. 
In conclusion, then, one should note that also in the 
present intuitionistic case, the notion of existence that 
is involved in the truth-maker analysis, namely the 
Weyl-Hilbert conception of existence-claims as ellip- 
tical, or truncated, 
S i s P  
judgements, is clearly non-propositional in nature. 
Accordingly, it is different from the existential quanti- 
fier. 
The notion of truth that is applicable to intuitionistic 
propositions, finally, can now be pieced together from 
the notion of proof-object and the notion of existence: 
the proposition A is true 
the concept pro@object  of  A exists. 
It should be noted that what has been explained here is 
the notion of truth simpliciter. This is the primary notion 
of truth that is involved at the most basic level, for 
instance in the formulation of a consequence 
A 1 t r u e , . . . ,  A~ true ~ C true. 
Since consequences can also hold between propositions 
which are in fact not true, we see here that from the very 
formulation 
A true 
of a proposition's being true simpliciter, it does not 
follow that the desired proof-object is there to be found. 
As Martin-L6f has explained, the intuitionist needs to 
distinguish between this notion of truth simpliciter, 
potQntial truth, when a proof-object can be found, and 
actual truth, when a proof-object has been found. 33 I 
have dealt with a number of the resulting complexities 
at some length elsewhere and accordingly I here confine 
myself with a reference to Martin-L6f's original paper 
and my own earlier remarks. 34 
* The present  paper was written during a sabbatical leave while 
visiting the Department of  Philosophy, University of  Stockholm, I 
am indebted to the Department,  as well as to the Wenner-Gren 
Foundation, Stockholm, for financial support that made the visit 
possible. Per Martin-L6f read the paper in manuscript and suggested 
a number of  improvements.  Unless otherwise indicated the English 
translations are my own. 
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Natrium und Lithium sind leichter als Wasser". (my boldface) 
In the first edition of Raum-Zeit-Materie (Julius Springer, Berlin, 
1918), Weyl does cite Schlick's Raum und Zeit in der gegenwdrtigen 
Physik (Julius Springer, Berlin, 1917), whence we know that Schlick 
was an author Weyl knew at the appropriate time. Also, the very 
last page of Weyl 's  book contains a publisher's announcement of 
the forthcoming book Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre by Moritz Schlick. 
Furthermore, Weyl kept track of Schlick's writings: in the fourth 
edition of Raum-Zeit-Materie (1921), the reference to Schlick has 
been updated to the third edition of 1920. Also in Philosophic der 
Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Handbuch der Philosophic (Abt. 
II, Heft 1, Mtinchen und Berlin, 1921), Weyl twice refers to the 1918 
edition of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. Thus, on balance, it seems 
likely that Weyl knew Schlick's text when he gave his lectures at 
ZUrich. 
Another possible source is the phenomenological tradition in the 
guise of Alexander Pf[inder's Logik, published in 1921, but written 
for Husserl 's 70th birthday in 1919. Of this I have only seen the 
second edition (Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1929), where PHlnder writes 
(p. 63): 
Es w~re zu gendankenlos, von der allgemeinen Formel des Urteils 
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"S ist P" auszugehen, und aus ihr das Existenzialurteil als 
pr~idikatloses Urteil einfach dadurch abzuleiten, class man das "P" 
wegl~isst und den Rest "S ist" als Formel des Existenzialurteils 
nimmt. Denn was man durch jene Weglassung des "P" in 
Wahrheit gewinnt, ist Uberhaupt kein Urteil mehr, sondern ein 
Urteilsbruchstiick. 
English translation: 
It would be too thoughtless simply to start with the general 
formula of the judgement "S is P" and derive the existential 
judgement from it as a predicateless judgement through the 
removal of "P" and putting the rest "S is" as the formula for the 
existential judgement. Because, in truth, what one gets through 
this removal of "P" is no longer a judgement anymore, but rather 
a judgementfragment. 
If formulations such as this were current in the phenomenological 
circles in which Weyl and his wife moved, they certainly constitute 
another possible, or even likely, source for his notion of an 
Urteilsabstrakt. 
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Bologna, 1991, pp. 141-149. 
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edited by Brian McGuinness and G. Oliveri, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1994 
p. 163, where an example involving a consequence between false 
propositions is worked out in detail. 
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